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This paper considers the e⁄ect of monetary policy and in￿ ation on retail
markets. It analyzes a model in which: goods are dated and produced prior
to being retailed, buyers direct their search on the basis of price and general
quality and, buyers￿match speci￿c tastes are their private information. Sell-
ers set the same price for all buyers but some do not value the good highly
enough to purchase it. The market economy is typically ine¢ cient as a social
planner would have the good consumed. The Friedman rule represents op-
timal policy as long as there is free-entry of sellers. When the upper bound
on the number of participating sellers binds su¢ ciently, moderate levels of
in￿ ation can be welfare improving.1 Introduction
This paper provides an analysis of how in￿ ation a⁄ects the choices made by
participants in retail markets. Goods are produced prior to being sold in a
market with matching frictions. So, sellers have to make inventory decisions
based on expected market conditions. At the same time, customers have to
choose their cash holding based on expected trading opportunities. When
customers￿realized preferences for goods are their private information, sellers
charge everyone the same price. Consequently, goods may not change hands
even when there are positive gains to trade. The aim, here, is to identify the
extent to which monetary policy can address this source of ine¢ ciency.
The framework is based on recent work on search based models of money
(e.g. Lagos and Wright [2005]). It incorporates two markets that individuals
cycle through each period. One market is characterized by centralized trade
and the other is a search market in which the opportunity to trade is proba-
bilistic. Following Rocheteau and Wright [2005] (henceforth RW) there is ex
ante heterogeneity in that some people, called sellers, can produce the good
traded in the search market but have no interest in consuming it. Buyers, on
the other hand, cannot produce the search market good but they do get util-
ity from its consumption. This absence of a double coincidence of wants in
the search market makes money essential. Buyers acquire money in the cen-
tralized market in which everyone can produce and consume. All individuals
(buyers and sellers) have the same quasi-linear preferences for centralized
market goods. This means that all buyers leave the market with the same
cash holdings and all sellers leave with none. Individuals cycle through these
markets forever.
As the focus of the paper is on how in￿ ation a⁄ects the production deci-
1sion of suppliers to frictional markets, a point of departure from the existing
literature is that sellers are required to produce goods prior to market entry.
Goods cannot be altered once made. Of course this requirement would have
little relevance if suppliers could store goods inde￿nitely.1 Either because
they rot (e.g. groceries), they are subject to fashion (e.g. clothes) or they
are subject to technological obsolescence (e.g. cars), many of the goods we
actually buy are dated. To capture this notion in its simplest form I assume
that unconsumed goods perish at the end of the search market.
From a theoretical standpoint the use of prior production has some dis-
tinct advantages over the more common approach in which production occurs
at the point of sale. First, it provides a more natural way to endogenize the
number of participating sellers. RW uses an arbitrary entry cost while here
the cost of making the good represents the cost of market entry. (The reason
why all sellers might not enter is that goods are perishable and they may not
￿nd a trading partner.) Second, it introduces an additional margin for po-
tential hold-up problems. Choosing the quality of the good prior to market
entry represents an investment by sellers who may not receive its marginal
private or social bene￿t. Third, for buyers to direct their search requires
some degree of commitment from the sellers as to the terms of trade. Here,
that commitment is a natural consequence of the environment. Once a good
of a given quality is made there is complete commitment to it.
Two main variants of the model are considered. In the baseline model
preferences of the buyers for the search good are ￿xed and identical. In the
extended model, potential buyers￿preferences are match speci￿c. Although
other market structures are discussed, both the baseline and the extended
1The interaction of non-perishable good purchases, inventories and in￿ ation is an in-
teresting topic that is not the focus of this paper.
2model incorporate what RW calls competitive search.2 Speci￿cally, buyers
are able to direct their search according to the quality of the good for sale
and its price. In the baseline model therefore, there are 4 decision margins:
buyers decide how much cash to bring, sellers decide on whether or not to
participate, the quality of the good to produce, and its price. The extended
model introduces a ￿fth decision margin: buyers set a reservation preference
level required to purchase the good. The paper considers the extent to which
monetary policy can bring about e¢ ciency on each or any of these margins.
A frequently voiced criticism of the random search approach to markets is:
￿I don￿ t shop like that! If I want a car, I go to the dealership; if I want shoes,
I go to the shoe shop. Where is the marketing?￿In contrast, competitive (or
directed) search may have overcorrected. There are distinct markets for every
conceivable speci￿cation of goods. Introducing match speci￿c preferences
provides a notion of imperfectly directed search - even though the shoe shop
may be easy to ￿nd, they may not have my size or a style I like.3
In the baseline model, the Friedman rule, that equates the gross rate
of money growth to the common discount factor, is shown to bring about
e¢ ciency on all 4 decision margins. Of course, goods do go to waste but
2There is some confusion as to the distinction between directed and competitive search.
Historically (e.g. Moen [1997]), competitive search was a continuous time construct in
which matching occurs sequentially in submarkets indexed by those features of goods (or
workers) that are known publicly. Directed search, on the other hand, has been associated
with either a one-shot or a discrete time environment in which one side of the market meets
the other in batches as in Acemoglu and Shimer [1999]. RW con￿ ates these structures by
introducing submarkets in discrete time with one-on-one meetings.
3This paper uses the term ￿imperfectly directed￿ search to capture the notion that
buyers may not know everything about a good before they go shopping for it. By contrast,
Menzio [2007] has a notion of ￿partially directed￿search in which (equivalently) sellers
cannot commit to prices but use them to signal the quality of their goods.
3no social planner who is subject to the same search frictions as the market
economy could do any better than monetary policy that follows the Friedman
rule. When the rate of money growth exceeds the discount factor, money
becomes costly to hold and this cost drives a ￿tax wedge￿between the utility
of buyers and the cost incurred by sellers.
In the extended model, a buyer￿ s true preference towards the good carried
by any seller he meets is his private information. Sellers cannot, therefore,
make the price contingent on the buyer￿ s type; they post a single price. Of
course, they can only recoup their cost of production when that price is
strictly positive. As long as the distribution of buyers￿preference shocks
attaches positive probability to every neighborhood of zero (i.e. there is a
chance that the buyer hardly likes the good) then buyers will sometimes
reject goods in favor of holding on to their cash. Still, since the good will rot
if not consumed, a social planner would have the seller hand the good over
to the buyer no matter how little the latter likes it. Monetary policy cannot,
therefore, be fully e¢ cient. It will be shown, however, that as long as there
is free-entry of sellers, the Friedman rule represents optimal monetary policy.
Even though increasing in￿ ation away from the Friedman rule makes buyers
less picky and actually increases seller participation, the sellers reduce the
quality of their output such that every one weakly prefers the Friedman rule.
To check the robustness of this result, the analysis considers what happens
if each of the decision margins are shut down. Making the quality of the good
exogenous does not a⁄ect the optimality of the Friedman rule. Increasing
in￿ ation away from the Friedman rule in this case, still has buyers being less
picky but now sellers reduce participation which reduces welfare more than
the improved transaction rate increases it. When the free-entry margin is
shut down, however, in￿ ation causes buyers to become less picky and sellers
4produce lower quality goods. The net e⁄ect of changes in in￿ ation at the
Friedman rule is ambiguous. If the upper bound on market entry for sellers
binds su¢ ciently, increases in in￿ ation away from the Friedman rule can
improve welfare.
2 Literature
Other papers that have incorporated a requirement on sellers to produce
prior to market entry are Jafarey and Masters [2003] and Dutu and Julien
[2008]. Both of these papers consider indivisible money. Jafarey and Mas-
ters [2003] use a random search environment with match speci￿c preference
shocks to address the relationship between prices and output under various
sources of economic growth. Dutu and Julien [2008] analyze a directed search
framework and is concerned with the existence of a monetary equilibrium.
The baseline model of the current paper is essentially Dutu and Julien [2008]
with divisible money. The extended model of the current paper is essentially
Jafarey and Masters [2003] with divisible money and competitive search.
A principal concern of the current paper like that of RW is the e¢ cacy
of monetary policy. In that paper, production only occurs at the point of
exchange. They consider 3 distinct market structures for the determination
of the terms of trade in the search market. The current paper only looks
at (what they refer to as) competitive search in detail. Ex post bargaining
does not work in the current baseline environment as buyers would bring no
money. A Walrasian type market with participants randomly chosen from
the buyers and sellers is discussed brie￿ y below. That model only predicts
nontrivial outcomes when the number of sellers exceeds the number of buyers.
In which case, sellers enter until the number of participants equals the number
5of buyers. But then, the price level is indeterminate leading a to a continuum
of equilibria. RW does not consider match speci￿c preferences but the version
of their model with random search and ex post bargaining does ￿nd that,
like the extended model of this paper, market equilibrium is ine¢ cient even
though the Friedman rule is optimal policy. The reasons are quite di⁄erent.
In RW there is a hold-up problem due to the ex post division of the match
surplus. Here it is the private information over preferences that prevents
prices being made contingent on type.
Search based monetary models that incorporate private information in-
clude Faig and Jerez [2006] and Ennis [2008]. In both of these there is
match-speci￿c preferences along the lines of that considered here but pro-
duction occurs at the point of sale. In Ennis [2008] matching is random and
sellers get all of the bargaining power. In the absence of private information
there would be no monetary exchange because buyers would have no incen-
tive to carry cash. With the private information, however, informational
rents accrue to the buyers restoring the possibility of monetary equilibria. In
Faig and Jerez [2006] search is directed but sellers post price schedules which
lead buyers to purchase goods in such a way as to reveal their type. In￿ ation
causes price schedules to ￿ atten out creating greater e¢ ciency losses than
would emerge without private information. By comparison, in the current
paper, because production occurs prior to market entry there is no mecha-
nism that can separate buyers by type.
63 Baseline Model
3.1 Environment
Time is discrete and continues forever. Every period of time is divided into 2
subperiods: day and night. During the day there is a centralized frictionless
market for a homogeneous and perfectly divisible good. In the night, trade
occurs in a decentralized market characterized by search frictions. There are
two types of individual in the model: those who consume the good produced
in the night market and those who can produce the night market good.
Following RW they will be referred to as buyers and sellers respectively. The
measure of buyers is normalized to 1 while the measure of sellers is ￿ n: All
the buyers enter each night market but only a subset of the sellers do. In
contrast to RW, for sellers to indicate a willingness to trade at night they
must produce a good. In any period t; the measure of sellers, nt; who enter
the night market will be controlled by a free-entry condition. The day good
is non-storable. The night good can be held by the seller for that night but
cannot be stored through the ensuing day.
The net instantaneous utility of a buyer at date t is
U
b
t = v(xt) ￿ yt + ￿du(qt);
where xt is the quantity of the day good consumed, yt is the quantity of
day good produced and qt is quality of the night good consumed. Here,
￿d ￿ 1 is a common discount factor between the day and the night. Both
instantaneous utility functions u and v are strictly increasing and strictly
concave. I also require that u(0) = 0; u0(0) = 1 and that there exists an x￿
such that v0(x￿) = 1: The function v(:) is normalized so that v(x￿) = x￿.
7The instantaneous utility of a seller at date t is
U
s
t = v(xt) ￿ yt ￿ c(qt);
where qt is now the quality of production and c(:) is the associated cost
function. Notice that the production occurs in the evening (i.e. at the
end of the daytime subperiod) and so ￿d does not apply. Sellers have to
produce before they enter the night market. They cannot augment their
production after the beginning of the night market which means that they
are fully committed to their choice of qt: I assume the cost function is strictly
increasing, strictly convex and c(0) = c0(0) = 0. I also assume limq!1 c0(q) =
1: This implies a unique ￿ q > 0 such that ￿du(￿ q) = c(￿ q) and a unique q￿
in [0; ￿ q] such that ￿du0(q￿) = c0(q￿). There is a common discount factor,
￿n < 1 between night and day. I will denote the product ￿n￿d by ￿; the





The night market is characterized by trading frictions. Speci￿cally, the
measures of buyers and sellers who get a trading opportunity are both equal
to ￿(n) where n is the measure of sellers who enter the market. I assume that
￿(n) ￿ minf1;ng; ￿(0) = 0; ￿0(n) > 0; ￿00(n) < 0 and limn!1 ￿(n) = 1:
These largely re￿ ect the requirement that the matching probability of the
buyers, ￿(n); does not exceed 1. The matching probability of the sellers
(with goods in hand) is ￿(n)=n which will also be less than 1 under these
restrictions. Constant returns to scale in matching is a further desirable (and
commonly assumed) feature of the underlying matching technology. Here,
this amounts to ￿(n)=n decreasing in n or ￿(n) ￿ ￿0(n)n: Given the previous
assumptions, this guaranteed if ￿0(0) = 1 which will be imposed in the sequel.
83.2 E¢ ciency in the baseline model
The Central Planner weights all individuals equally in the welfare function.
(Money provides no utility so it does not feature in the Planner￿ s problem.)
As recognized in RW, these models do not feature any transitional dynamics
so the Planner can and will always choose a stationary path for consumption.
Equal treatment implies that contingent on type (buyer or seller) everyone
produces and consumes the same amount. The Planner is subject to the
same trading frictions as the market but does not require quid pro quo for
exchange to occur. As utility functions are strictly increasing and goods are
perishable, all output brought to any trading opportunity will be consumed.
Unlike in RW, however, the Planner cannot avoid output going to waste.
The Planner maximizes
W(x;n;q; ￿ n) ￿ (v(x) ￿ x)(1 + ￿ n) + ￿d￿(n)u(q) ￿ nc(q) (1)
subject to n ￿ ￿ n:





0(qp) = 0 (2)
n : ￿d￿
0(np)u(qp) ￿ c(qp) = 0 (3)
The choice of xp = x￿ is clearly optimal (by assumption) and independent of
q and n: As W(x￿;:;:; ￿ n) is not necessarily concave, the existence of np and
qp are more problematic.
Claim 1 The optimal choices, np and qp respectively of the number of active
sellers and output per seller exist in (0; ￿ n] ￿ (0;q￿):
9Proof. This is special case of Claim 3 below.
The di⁄erentiability of W(x;n;q; ￿ n) and the fact that the ￿rst order con-
ditions are necessary for an interior solution means that whenever np < ￿ n;
(np;qp) solves (2) and (3). Otherwise, qp is the unique solution to
￿d￿(￿ n)u
0(qp) ￿ ￿ nc
0(qp) = 0:
3.3 Baseline Model Market Economy
In the absence of a Central Planner, the coincidence of wants problem makes
some form of money essential. Here, money is perfectly divisible and agents
can hold any non-negative amount. The aggregate nominal money supply Mt
grows at constant gross rate ￿ so that Mt+1 = ￿Mt. New money is injected (or
withdrawn if ￿ < 1) by lump-sum transfers (taxes) in the day (centralized)
market. Following RW I assume these transfers go only to buyers, but this
is not essential for the results. What matters is that transfers do not depend
on the choices individuals make. Also, we restrict attention to policies where
￿ ￿ ￿. For ￿ < ￿ there is no equilibrium.
In the day market the price of goods is normalized to 1 at each date
t, while the relative price of money is denoted ￿t. Let zt = ￿tmt be the
real value of an amount of money mt. I will focus throughout on steady-
state allocations in which aggregate real variables are constant over time.
This means that ￿t+1 = ￿t=￿: It will be useful to use individual real money
balances, zt; as the individual￿ s choice variable for money holding rather than
mt:
Once a seller chooses the quality, q; of the good she intends to bring to
the night market and the real price, d; at which she intends to sell it, neither
10can be changed.4 These price quality pairs (q;d) are observed by all buyers
who use them a basis for directing their search. Thus, a seller￿ s the choice
of a pair, (q;d) opens a submarket for goods of quality q at price d to which
other sellers and buyers may be attracted. If n represents the ratio of sellers
to buyers in that submarket, then ￿(n) and ￿(n)=n will be respectively the
matching probability of buyers and sellers in that submarket. Submarkets
are therefore indexed by ! 2 ￿ = R3
+ where ! = (d;q;n).
Timing within a period is as follows. In the morning, sellers each an-
nounce q; the quality of the good they are going to produce and d; the real
price at which they will part with it. On the basis of this knowledge, buyers
decide how much money they will need for the night market and trade in the
day market accordingly. As the terms of trade are predetermined and there
is an opportunity cost to holding money (foregone daytime consumption),
buyers only bring enough with them to acquire the a good in the submarket
they have chosen to enter: z = d: So that when sellers pick d they are e⁄ec-
tively also choosing the cash holdings of anyone they meet. In the sequel I
use ! = (z;q;n): As sellers have no use for money in the night market they
enter with zero cash balances.
Let V i(!) be the value to entering submarket ! for i = s;b (respectively
































where W i(z); i = s;b are the values to entering the day market with real
4The nominal price of a good with real price d is d=￿t:









subject to ^ z + x = z + T + y




fv(x) ￿ y + max[￿dV
s(^ !) ￿ c(^ q);￿W
s(0)]g (6)
subject to x = z + y
Both problems (5) and (6) and are subject to non-negativity constraints on
x, y; and ^ z: In the absence of these, it should be clear that irrespective of
the values of other variables, both buyers and sellers pick x = x￿ > 0: For
y ￿ 0 to bind on buyers, requires x￿ < z ￿ ^ z +T: As all buyers get the same
transfer, this will never bind in steady-state.5 As sellers do not bring money
into the night market, y ￿ 0 requires that x￿ ￿ z: The analysis continues as
if this is true. Any implied restrictions on parameters will be derived below.
It means that x = x￿ throughout and neither x nor y appear as components
of equilibrium.
De￿nition 2 A symmetric, competitive search equilibrium is a submarket,
~ ! = (~ z; ~ q; ~ n) such that given all other buyers and sellers enter ~ !; then ~ ! solves
both the individual buyer￿ s problem, (5), and the individual sellers problem,
5Suppose ￿ z is the steady state real money balances brought to the night market by
buyers in period t ￿ 1: Then in the morning of period t, if they were successful in buying
something zt = 0; if not zt = ￿ z=￿: But,
T = (￿ ￿ 1)mt=￿t+1 = ￿ z(￿ ￿ 1)=￿
So y is at least equal to x￿:
12(6) subject to
￿dV
s(^ !) ￿ c(^ q) = ￿dV




= ￿W s(0) for ~ n ￿ ￿ n
￿ ￿W s(0) for ~ n = ￿ n
The restriction to symmetry here means that there is a unique market
to which all buyers and sellers go. This choice is motivated by RW who
provide the analysis for the more general case but then restrict attention to
equilibria with a unique active market. As non-negativity of y; does not bind
(by assumption) it is immediate from (5) and (6), that W i(z) = z + W i(0)
for i = b;s and that the amount of money brought into the night market is
independent of the amount brought into the day market that morning.
To characterize equilibrium we posit the existence of an ~ ! and consider
the choice of a seller who considers deviation by announcing production of a
good of quality q and demanding real balances z in exchange for the good.
Buyers will enter the deviant￿ s submarket in such numbers as makes them
indi⁄erent between that market and the one speci￿ed by the equilibrium.
So, after accounting for the opportunity cost of cash brought into the night
market,




b(!) ￿ z = ￿dV
b(~ !) ￿ ~ z (7)
￿dV
s(~ !) ￿ c(~ q) ￿ ￿W
s(0);
and ~ n ￿ ￿ n
It is now well known (see RW, Masters [2009], or Rogerson et al [2005])
that competitive search equilibrium in this environment will be isomorphic
to that in the ￿dual￿ economy. In the dual here, buyers will commit to
and advertise both prices and goods qualities at which they are willing to
13trade and sellers search accordingly. This latter economy is preferred here
for expositional purposes. The buyers￿problem that corresponds to Problem
(7) is:6







s(!) ￿ c(q) = ￿dV





￿dV s(~ !) ￿ c(~ q) = ￿W s(0) for ~ n < ￿ n
￿dV s(~ !) ￿ c(~ q) ￿ ￿W s(0) for ~ n = ￿ n
Substituting in for the value functions and eliminating z using the constraint,
reduces problem (8) to
(~ n; ~ q) 2 arg max
(n;q)2[0;￿ n]￿[0;1)
8
> > > <
> > > :






+[￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿(n)￿][￿dV s(~ !) ￿ c(~ q) ￿ ￿W s(0)]
+￿W b(0)
9
> > > =
> > > ;
(9)
The reason for recasting the problem should now be clear. Except for con-
stant terms, problem (9) in the market economy and the Planner￿ s problem,
(1), coincide when ￿ = ￿: That is, the Friedman rule is e¢ cient in this base-
line economy. Of course goods carried by sellers who do not match still go
to waste but a social planner subject to the same matching frictions could
not do any better than the market economy does at the Friedman rule.
In general the objective function in problem (9) is not concave so that a
unique solution is not assured.
Claim 3 A solution, (~ n; ~ q); to problem (9) exists within (0; ￿ n] ￿ (0;q￿)
Proof. De￿ne ￿(n;q) as






6It is simple to verify that the ￿rst order conditions are identical.
14Continuity of ￿(n;q) immediately implies that it achieves a maximum on
[0; ￿ n] ￿ [0;q￿]: So we have to show that (i) this maximum must also solve
problem (9) (ii) it cannot exist on any boundary except n = ￿ n:
Assertion (i) follows from the strict concavity of ￿(n;q) with respect to
q and the fact that ￿(n) < n for any n > 0 means that @￿
@q
￿ ￿ ￿
q=q￿ < 0: So for
any n 2 [0; ￿ n]; and q > q￿; ￿(n;q) can always be increased by reducing q to
be less than q￿:
Assertion (ii) follows because
lim

















> 0 for all n > 0
This means that ￿(n;q) achieves some strictly positive value for some q > 0
ruling out the portion of the q axis in the interval (0; ￿ n]: Now, for all n > 0




q=q￿ < 0 and ￿(n;q) is strictly concave in
q: This rules out the portion of q = q￿ in the interval (0; ￿ n]:








so ￿(n;q) ￿ 0 for n = 0 and q 2 [0;q￿]: This means that ￿(n;q) cannot
attain a maximum on the n axis.
The concavity of the objective function with respect to q means that if
~ n = ￿ n; the solution is unique. In that case ~ q solves,
￿
2(￿ n)￿d￿u
0(q) ￿ ￿ n[￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿(￿ n)￿]c
0(q) = 0:
For any interior solution (~ n; ~ q) to problem (9) we have,
￿
2(n)￿d￿u
0(q) ￿ n[￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿(n)￿]c
0(q) = 0 (10)
￿
0(n)￿(n)￿d￿u(q) ￿ [(1 ￿ ￿(n))(￿ ￿ ￿) + ￿(n)￿]c(q) = 0 (11)
15where ￿(n) ￿
￿0(n)n
￿(n) ; the elasticity of the matching function with respect to
the number of sellers in the submarket. A requirement for the solution of
(9) to be an equilibrium is that the implied value of y; production in the
day market, be non-negative for all participants. As discussed above this
requires z ￿ x￿: Given other parameters, we can always chose v(:) in such
a way that this requirement will not bind. Given v(:); however, equilibrium
is characterized by the solutions to equations (10) and (11) subject to ￿ ￿
￿(~ n)￿x￿=~ nc(~ q) (a su¢ cient condition for this is ￿ ￿ ￿(￿ n)￿x￿=￿ nc(q￿)):
Rearranging equations (10) and (11), dividing (10) by (11), and multi-
plying through by q yields
eu(q) =
￿
￿(n)[￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿(n)￿]
(1 ￿ ￿(n))(￿ ￿ ￿) + ￿(n)￿
￿
ec(q): (12)
Here eu and ec are elasticities of the utility and cost function respectively.
It is straightforward to show that if ￿(n) decreases monotonically so do the
contents the parentheses in (12).7 Consequently, a su¢ cient condition for the
uniqueness of equilibrium is that the utility and cost functions be isoelastic
and ￿0(n) < 0:8 Under the Friedman rule, ￿ = ￿; equation (12) reduces to
eu(q) = ￿(n)ec(q): (13)
7The elasticity of the matching function cannot increase monotonically as ￿(0) = 1 and
￿(n) 2 [0;1] for all n:
8Examples of functions that satisfy the requirements on ￿(n) are





or any convex combination of any 2 of them. In all such cases ￿(n) declines monotonically
from 1 to 0.
16As the contents the parentheses in (12) are increasing in ￿, money is
not super-neutral. Increasing the rate of money growth increases the wedge
between the elasticities of cost and utility. If they are isoelastic and ￿0(n) < 0;
participation by sellers, n; will fall as the rate of money growth increases. It
then follows from the second order conditions that if (q;n) is an optimum, q
also decreases with ￿:
3.4 Alternative market economies
The environment studied so far is essentially the directed search version of
RW but with ex ante production. For comparability with the literature then,
we should also consider random search with ex post bargaining, and prices
determined in a Walrasian fashion in the night market.
In order to use random search with ex post Nash bargaining we need to
assume (as in RW and Lagos and Wright [2005]) that buyers￿money holdings
are revealed in bilateral meetings.9 In any case buyers are aware that they
cannot pay more for the good than they bring to the market. When goods are
produced at the point of sale, buyers are incentivized to bring cash because
more money gets them a nicer good. When goods are produced ex ante,
no such bene￿t to bringing more money exists. So, for any strictly positive
amount of money held by other buyers an individual can will always bring
slightly less money and acquire the good. That is, any proposed non-trivial
equilibrium will unravel as in Diamond [1971].
As recognized in RW, in the presence of a double coincidence of wants
problem and anonymity, money continues to be essential even under price
9In contrast, the directed search model described above remains completely agnostic
with respect to whether or not buyers￿money holdings are private information - money
holding is revealed in equilibrium through their search behavior.
17taking behavior. Frictions are captured by introducing a probability that
any buyer only gets an opportunity to trade with probability ￿b and sellers
get to trade with probability ￿s = ￿(n)=n where n is the number of sellers
who produce a good.
De￿nition 4 A Walrasian equilibrium is a tuple, (pw;qw;nw) such that given
the real price, pw; and goods quality, qw:
￿ buyers are at least as well o⁄ from bringing real balances pw to the
market as bringing 0 (i.e. not trading)
￿ if nw < ￿ n sellers are indi⁄erent between market entry and non-participation
￿ if nw = ￿ n sellers are at least as well o⁄ from participation as non-
participation
￿ the market clears
If ￿b > ￿(￿ n) then buyers necessarily outnumber sellers. Because ￿nal
goods are indivisible, for any given quality of good, the price will be that
which extracts all ex post surplus from buyers. But as buyers face an oppor-
tunity cost of acquiring money in the day market they will simply bring no
money and the market collapses. If ￿b < ￿(￿ n) the entry margin for sellers is
active. Whenever there are more sellers than buyers the price of goods will
fall to zero - the residual value of the good to the seller. Consequently only
enough sellers will enter so as to ensure that ￿b = ￿(n): That is, the number
of buyers and sellers entering the market will endogenously be equal. The
value of ￿b pins down nw:10 Given nw; equilibrium requires that sellers be
10If, as in RW, ￿b ￿ ￿(n) then there will necessarily be indeterminacy of equilibrium.
18indi⁄erent between participation and non-participation. Thus,
￿dV
s(p;q;nw) ￿ c(q) = ￿W
s(0):





We also require that buyers are at least as well o⁄from bringing su¢ cient
cash to buy the good into the night market as they are from bringing no
money and consuming nothing. Thus
￿dV
b(p;q;nw) ￿ p ￿ V
b(0;0;nw):
Substituting for V b implies






For given v(:); non-negativity of day time production for the sellers requires





Walrasian equilibria are therefore characterized as any combination (pw;qw;nw)
that satisfy equation (14) and inequalities (15) and (16) with ￿(nw) = ￿b:







Because there is no opportunity cost of carrying money, buyers do not care
about the real price of the good so any positive qw such that pw does not
19exceed x￿ is consistent with equilibrium. Away from the Friedman rule (i.e.
when ￿ > ￿) substituting for pw into inequality (15) yields
￿d￿￿
2(nw)u(qw) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿(nw))nwc(qw)(￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ 0: (17)
The left hand side of (17) is concave in qw: It holds with equality at zero and
some strictly positive ￿nite value of qw which I will label ￿ qw: Clearly, for nw
given, ￿ qw approaches zero as ￿ gets large. Now let ~ qw be the solution to
￿nwc(qw) ￿ ￿￿(nw)x
￿ = 0
Again, ~ qw; approaches zero as ￿ gets large. So, we have continuum of equilib-
ria for every value of nw which are indexed by qw in the range [0;maxf￿ qw; ~ qwg]:
4 Match-speci￿c heterogeneity
This section incorporates the idea that search may be imperfectly directed
in that all aspects of a good may not be known prior to seeing it. Thus, a
buyer￿ s instantaneous utility from consumption of a good of general quality
q becomes "u(q) where " ￿ G(:) is realized after the buyer and seller meet.
The distribution G(:) is assumed to be continuous on (0;￿ "] and di⁄erentiable
with density, g(:): The realized value of " is the private information of the
buyer. For this extended environment ￿ q is rede￿ned such that ￿ "u(￿ q) = c(￿ q):
4.1 E¢ ciency
As utility functions are strictly increasing, goods are perishable and " > 0,
whether or not the planner observes the realized value of " is moot - all output
brought to any trading opportunity should be consumed. The Planner￿ s
20objective function becomes
W(x;n;q; ￿ n) ￿ (v(x) ￿ x)(1 + ￿ n) + ￿d￿(n)^ "u(q) ￿ nc(q)
where ^ " is the unconditional expected value of ": The e¢ cient outcome is
identical to that of the baseline model with u(q) replaced by ^ "u(q).
4.2 Market Economy
Borrowing from the preceding analysis, we know that as long as sellers set
the same real price, z; buyers will bring that amount of money into the night
market (or nothing). Let ! ￿ (z;q;n): The value to being a buyer in the



















where W b(:) is the value function for buyers in the day market and is identical
to that derived for the baseline model. This is because they choose whether to
give up their cash for the good only after they meet the seller and realize the
extent to which they want it. From earlier analysis we know that W b(z) =

















Given, !; let "R = ￿nz=￿u(q) which represents the reservation match speci￿c
preference shock for the buyer above which she will purchase the good and
below which she will not. It follows that
V














21where the ￿nal equality comes from integration by parts.




















This is because the probability that a seller gets to trade in the night market
is equal to the probability,
￿(n)
n ; he meets a buyer, times the probability,
1 ￿ G("R); with which the buyer is wiling to give up her cash for the good





[1 ￿ G("R)]￿nz + ￿nW
s(0)
Equilibrium is still described by De￿nition 2 and can be characterized as
the solution to Problem (18).







s(!) ￿ c(q) = ￿dV





￿dV s(~ !) ￿ c(~ q) = ￿W s(0) for ~ n < ￿ n
￿dV s(~ !) ￿ c(~ q) ￿ ￿W s(0) for ~ n = ￿ n
and ￿u(q)"R = ￿nz
Substituting for the value functions and eliminating z yields
(~ n; ~ q;~ "R) 2 arg max
(n;q;"R)2[0;￿ n]￿[0;1)￿[0;￿ "]





￿d[1 ￿ G("R)]"Ru(q) ￿ c(q) = X
where X =
￿(~ n)
~ n ￿d[1 ￿ G(~ "R)]~ "Ru(~ q) ￿ c(~ q) which is 0 under free-entry and
positive when n = ￿ n: Simple inspection of the constraint in problem (19)
22and the fact that X ￿ 0; indicate that for any solution ~ q ￿ ￿ q: The choice set
is therefore compact and continuity of the objective function implies that a
solution exists.11 The appropriate Lagrangian is






￿d[1 ￿ G("R)]"Ru(q) + c(q)
￿
















SG("R)[1 ￿ G("R) ￿ g("R)"R]
=
￿(n)￿￿(n)
(1 ￿ ￿(n))[￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿(n)￿(1 ￿ G("R))]
(21)
It is immediate from equation (20) that in any non-trivial equilibrium,
"R > 0: A Social Planner, however, could choose n = ~ n and q = ~ q and achieve
a higher degree of welfare by setting "R = 0 ￿the market equilibrium cannot
be e¢ cient.
In a labor market context with a similar source of private information,
Guerrieri [2008] shows that steady-state allocations are constrained e¢ cient.
The source of ine¢ ciency here by comparison comes from the lack of long-
term trading relationships and the need to provide incentives for sellers to
produce.
11In this model, depending on the form of G(:), the possibility that ~ n and ~ q; and hence
~ z; are all zero cannot be ruled out.
234.3 Monetary Policy
The objective of monetary policy is to bring about the best social outcome
achievable within the market economy through the manipulation of ￿; the
gross growth rate of the money supply. Thus we view (~ !;~ "R) as a function
of ￿: The the contribution to welfare from night market activity is12
~ Wm(￿) ￿ ￿(~ n)￿d[1 ￿ G(~ "R)]Ef"j"￿~ "Rg"u(~ q) ￿ ~ nc(~ q)
This is because the number of exchanges is equal to the measure of buy-
ers, 1; times the probability they meet a buyer, ￿(n); times the probability
they will ￿nd the good attractive enough to give up their cash for it. And,








~ Wm(￿) = ￿(~ n)￿d [SG(~ "R) + (1 ￿ G(~ "R))~ "R]u(~ q) ￿ ~ nc(~ q): (22)
Using the constraint in problem (19) we obtain
~ Wm(￿) = ￿(~ n)￿dSG(~ "R)u(~ q) + ~ nX (23)
The optimal policy problem is to maximize ~ Wm(￿) over ￿ given ~ n; ~ q and ~ "R
are determined by the constraint in problem (19), equation (20) and equation
(21). Under free-entry, X = 0 so when ￿ = ￿; the optimal policy problem is
identical to maximizing the solution to problem (19) with respect to ￿: By
the envelope theorem, then
d ~ Wm(￿)
d￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿=￿
= 0:
12Since x = x￿ at every period, the day market contribution to welfare is not a⁄ected
by monetary policy.
24While the second order condition has not been veri￿ed, in all of the examples
that follow, under free-entry moving away from the Friedman rule lowers
~ Wm(￿): The Friedman rule therefore implements optimal monetary policy
under free-entry and in￿ ation has only second-order welfare e⁄ects.
This result re￿ ects the universality of the Friedman rule. In this model,
buyers get to choose how much money to bring with them and make pur-
chasing decisions based on private information which is not fully revealed in
equilibrium. Sellers get to choose whether to enter the market or not and
if they choose to enter, the quality of the good to bring with them. Still,
optimal monetary policy follows a simple rule that sets the gross rate of
money growth equal to the discount factor of the population. New to this
extension of the baseline line environment however is the buyers￿purchasing
decision. We know that a social planner would prefer that goods change
hands in every meeting but because prices cannot be made contingent on a
buyer￿ s realized preference for the good, some trades do not occur. What
the policy result tells us is that when all other decisions in the economy are
being made optimally, the Friedman rule causes buyers to reject goods in a
way that is undistorted by the opportunity cost of holding money.
When the population of participating sellers is ￿xed or the upper bound
on the number of sellers binds (so that n = ￿ n); equation (23) still applies.
But, X is not ￿xed with respect to ￿: In such cases, the Friedman rule
may fail to implement optimal monetary policy. Further discussion of this
possibility is provided in the next section.
255 Discussion
5.1 Interior solution (free-entry)
As long as the upper bound on n does not bind, there is an interior solution
to problem (19) and equilibrium is characterized by equations (20), (21) and
the free-entry condition,
￿(n)￿d[1 ￿ G("R)]"Ru(q) ￿ nc(q) = 0: (24)
Dividing equation (20) by (24) yields
￿(n)￿SG("R)[eu(q) ￿ ￿(n)ec(q)] = "R(￿ ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿(n))eu(q) (25)
Which means that at the Friedman rule, the elasticities equation (13) still





SG("R)[1 ￿ G("R) ￿ g("R)"R]
Beyond this, equations (20), (21) and (24) have not been amenable to general
analysis. Equation (25), however, points to an obvious simpli￿cation. If u(:)
and c(:) have constant elasticities eu and ec respectively then (25) is an
equation in n and "R only. And, if G(:) is uniform on [0;1]; then (21), (24)
and (25) become
2"R(1￿￿(n))[￿￿￿+￿(n)￿(1￿"R)]￿￿(n)￿￿(n)(1￿"R)(1￿2"R) = 0 (26)
￿(n)￿d[1 ￿ "R]"Ru(q) ￿ nc(q) = 0 (27)
￿(n)￿￿(n)(1 ￿ "R)
2[eu ￿ ￿(n)ec] ￿ 2"R (￿ ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿(n))eu = 0 (28)
The system is block recursive. Equations (26) and (28) give n and "R: Then,
q can be obtained from (27). To obtain comparative statics at the Friedman
26rule we di⁄erentiate the system (26) and (28) and then impose ￿ = ￿: Un-
der this restriction, (26) and (28) reduce to "R = ￿(n)=2 and eu = ￿(n)ec
respectively which means (~ n; ~ q;~ "R) is unique and
d~ "R
d￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿=￿
= ￿
￿(~ n)(2 + ￿(~ n))(1 ￿ ￿(~ n))
￿(~ n)￿(￿(~ n) ￿ 2)2
d~ n
d￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿=￿
= ￿
4(1 ￿ ￿(~ n))￿2(~ n)
￿(~ n)￿￿0(~ n)(￿(~ n) ￿ 2)2
Under the maintained assumption that ￿0(n) < 0; at the Friedman rule ~ "R is
decreasing and ~ n is increasing in ￿. This means that increased in￿ ation lowers
the reservation utility at which buyers will part with their money. Essentially,
because holding on to money is costly due to in￿ ation, buyers are less picky
about what to purchase. We also see increased seller participation. Recall
that, under free-entry, equilibrium welfare in the market economy is
~ Wm(￿) = ￿(~ n)￿dSG(~ "R)u(~ q) = ￿(~ n)￿d(1 ￿ ~ "R)
2u(~ q)=2
Both the e⁄ect on ~ "R and ~ n taken alone should therefore increase overall
welfare. However, it is straightforward to verify that the e⁄ect of increased
in￿ ation on ~ q is su¢ ciently negative that it exactly o⁄sets the welfare gains
through ~ "R and ~ n:
5.2 Exogenous q
Given the foregoing, an obvious question is: if we shut down the quality
margin will increased in￿ ation close to the Friedman rule improve welfare?
If q = ￿ q is exogenous, sellers simply enter with a good of quality ￿ q or stay
home. Of course the price, z; is still endogenous along with n and "R: Under
27uniform G(:), It is straightforward to show that equilibrium conditions are
2"R(1 ￿ ￿(n))[￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿(n)￿(1 ￿ "R)] ￿ ￿(n)￿￿(n)(1 ￿ "R)(1 ￿ 2"R) = 0




￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿=￿
=
￿2(~ n)(1 ￿ ￿(~ n))




￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿=￿
= ￿
4~ n(1 ￿ ￿(~ n))￿(~ n)









0(~ n)(1 ￿ ~ "R)
2 d~ n
d￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿=￿
￿ 2￿(~ n)(1 ￿ ~ "R)
d~ "R
d￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿=￿
= 0
that is, with q held ￿xed, in￿ ation has the opposite e⁄ect on sellers propensity
to enter the market. When the quality of the good is a choice variable, sellers
reduce the quality of their goods due to the lower value of money but increase
participation because the chance of trading increases. Here, although buyers
get less picky, sellers reduce participation because money is less valued and
they cannot adjust the quality of the good to be sold.
5.3 Exogenous n
When there is no free-entry, competition for buyers still prevails across poten-
tial markets. However, as we seek a symmetric (single market) equilibrium,
~ n = ￿ n: The goods quality, q; the reservation utility, "R and the price, z re-
main endogenous. The equilibrium conditions are therefore (20) and (21)
with n = ￿ n: Restricting attention to uniform G(:), at the Friedman rule,
these equations reduce to "R = ￿(n)=2 and
￿(￿ n)￿d[2 ￿ ￿(￿ n)]u
0(q) ￿ 4￿ nc
0(q) = 0
28Di⁄erentiating the system and evaluating at ￿ = ￿ yields
d~ "R
d￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿=￿
=
￿￿(￿ n)(1 ￿ ￿(￿ n))








￿4(1 ￿ ￿(￿ n))(3 ￿ ￿(￿ n))u0(~ q)c0(~ q)
￿(￿ n)￿(2 ￿ ￿(￿ n))2 [u0(~ q)c00(~ q) ￿ u00(~ q)c0(~ q)]
< 0:
Again, in￿ ation makes buyers less picky even though sellers reduce the quality
of their good.










u(~ q) ￿ ￿ nc(~ q): (29)







￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿=￿
=
￿(￿ n)(1 ￿ ￿(￿ n))
￿n(2 ￿ ￿(￿ n))
"
￿(￿ n)u(~ q) ￿
(3 ￿ ￿(￿ n))c0(~ q)(u0(~ q))
2
u0(~ q)c00(~ q) ￿ u00(~ q)c0(~ q)
#
:
The sign of which is ambiguous. Simulations indicate that when ￿ n is signif-
icantly lower than the number of sellers that would participate under free-
entry, welfare increases with in￿ ation.13 When the upper bound on n binds,
sellers can extract positive rents from those buyers who get trading oppor-
tunities. As the cost of holding money increases, those rents are diminished.
5.4 Exogenous n and q
If n = ￿ n and q = ￿ q; equilibrium is characterized by the ￿rst-order conditions
of problem (19) with respect to n and "R: An immediate implication is that
13For example if ￿(n) = 1 ￿ e￿n; u(q) = 4q
1
2; c(q) = q2; ￿d = 0:95; and ￿n = 0:96 then
at the Friedman rule, ￿ = ￿; with free entry, ~ n = 2:337, ~ q = 0:296, ~ z = 0:258; ~ "R = 0:125:
If we now set ￿ n = 0:2337; a tenth of its free entry value, we have ~ n = 0:2337 (the upper
bound on n binds), ~ q = 0:381; ~ z = 1:042; ~ "R = 0:444. And, the elasticity of welfare with
respect to ￿ (at the Friedman rule), is 0:119.




￿2~ "R(1 ￿ ￿(￿ n))
￿(￿ n)￿ [￿(￿ n) + 2(1 ￿ 2~ "R)] + 2(1 ￿ ￿(￿ n))(￿ ￿ ￿)
< 0: (30)
When the population of sellers and the quality of goods are ￿xed, in￿ ation
makes buyers less picky. Which means, from equation (29), that welfare
increases with in￿ ation. The e⁄ect of in￿ ation on on the real price of night
market goods, z; can be positive or negative depending on the magnitudes of
￿(￿ n) and ￿(￿ n). What equation (30) tells us is that z can never fall su¢ ciently
that buyers get picker as in￿ ation increases.
5.5 Degenerate G(:)
If we let G(:) be represented by a mass point at ￿ "; the economy reverts back
to that of the baseline model. The fraction, "R; of utility derived from the
consumption of a good that would be just acceptable to buyers ex post,
however, is still well de￿ned. From (21) we know that "R < ￿ " so SG("R) =
1 ￿ "R; G("R) = 0 and g("R) = 0: Equation (21) now implies
"R =
￿(n)￿￿(n)
(1 ￿ ￿(n))(￿ ￿ ￿) + ￿(n)￿
so that under the Friedman rule "R = ￿(n): This is because the baseline
model achieves e¢ ciency at the Friedman rule and e¢ ciency requires that the
(proportional) marginal contribution to the matching rate of buyers should
be equal to ratio of the value of matching to the value of being unmatched.
In￿ ation creates a distortionary cost of holding money which drives a wedge
between ￿(n) and "R:
Shutting down either free-entry or ￿xing the quality of goods in the base-
line model does not a⁄ect the e¢ ciency of the Friedman rule. If all decision
margins (except how much cash to bring to the night market) are shut down,
30directed search ensures that the night market is still active in that buyers
pay positive amounts of money for goods. However, monetary policy cannot
a⁄ect welfare because all of the variables that matter to the Social Planner
are ￿xed.
6 Alternative market structures
6.1 Lucky bags
The most straightforward institutional arrangement that would return the
environment to essentially that of the baseline model is to make buyers pay for
the good before observing it. In this arrangement, the general quality of the
good is still universally known but sellers require payment before they allow
the buyer to realize his match-speci￿c taste shock. Hotwire.com currently
uses a similar approach to sell hotel rooms.
6.2 Market makers
A common device used to motivate competitive search (see Moen [1997]) are
￿market makers￿who announce the set of submarkets that will be open that
night. Faig and Huangfu [2007] point out that in such an environment there
is nothing to prevent market makers from charging entry fees. Moreover,
because entry fees are paid for sure, they reduce the need for buyers to carry
idle cash balances. Their paper addresses this issue in the RW model. It
incorporates competitive entry of market makers, so that their pro￿ts are
driven to zero and entry fees are simply transfers from buyers to sellers. In
the competitive search equilibrium with market makers, they are shown to
completely eliminate the transaction price. Furthermore, the market maker
31equilibrium is always at least as e¢ cient as the competitive search equilibrium
without market makers. In the current paper, because they reduce transac-
tions prices, entry fees can also help to address the ine¢ ciency generated by
private information.
To reduce the extent of exposition, attention is restricted to con￿gurations
in which the free-entry margin is active (i.e. n < ￿ n): We know that the
Friedman rule represents optimal policy in this case so any further welfare
gains will be attributable to the entrance fees. Let Zi; i = b;s be the real
entrance fees for buyers and sellers respectively. A typical element of ￿; the
set of all potential submarkets, is now ! = (Zb;Zs;z;q;n): Here, z represents
the total real cash balances carried by buyers into the night market. So the





















b(!) = [￿(n)SG("R) ￿ "R]u(q) + ￿nW
b (0)
where "R = ￿n(z ￿ Zb)=￿u(q):
























After recognizing that competition between market makers drives their pro￿t





[￿(n)(1 ￿ G("R))(z ￿ Zb) + Zb] + ￿nW
s(0)
32Equilibrium is characterized by the solution to







s(!) ￿ c(q) = ￿W
s(0) (31)
￿u(q)"R = ￿n(z ￿ Zb)
"R ￿ 0
Problem (31) corresponds to problem (18) in the extended model. The dif-
ference simply re￿ ects the focus on the free-entry of sellers and that the non-
negativity of "R might now bind. After substituting for the value functions
and eliminating Zb; the appropriate Lagrangian is
L = ￿d [￿(n)SG("R) ￿ "R]u(q) ￿ z
+ ￿￿d [￿nz ￿ ￿u(q)"R f1 ￿ ￿(n)(1 ￿ G("R))g] ￿ ￿￿nc(q) + ￿"R
where ￿ and ￿ are the co-state variables.
The ￿rst-order condition for z implies ￿ = ￿
￿1: Which means the ￿rst-
order condition for "R reduces to
u(q)
￿n
f￿￿"R￿(n)g("R) ￿ [1 ￿ ￿(n)(1 ￿ G("R))](￿ ￿ ￿)g + ￿ = 0: (32)
Suppose the solution for ~ "R > 0: Then, the contents of the curly brackets
in equation (32) are strictly negative which implies ￿ > 0: Complementary
slackness, however, requires that ￿"R = 0 ￿the only viable solution is ~ "R = 0:
This means that Zb = z and the transaction price are zero. The remaining
equilibrium conditions are,












33These clearly coincide with the Planner￿ s optimality conditions at the Fried-
man rule. For values of ￿ close to ￿; in￿ ation only has second-order welfare
e⁄ects. Moreover, away from the Friedman rule welfare in the market maker
model is higher than that under the baseline economy. This is because (sim-
ilarly to Faig and Huangfu [2007]) buyers get W s(0) in both regimes and
the objective functions in both problems (7) and (31) are buyer￿ s welfare.
The di⁄erence between the problems is that in problem (7), Zb and Zs are
constrained to be zero.
7 Conclusion
This paper provides insight into the e⁄ect of monetary policy and in￿ ation
on participants in retail markets. It provides an analysis of a model that has
three features that add realism to those considered in the literature. These
are that goods are produced prior to being retailed, that goods are dated,
and that buyers cannot base their choice over where to shop on every aspect
of the good they wish to purchase. As the realized preference for a good
is a buyer￿ s private information, a market economy is necessarily ine¢ cient.
Sellers need to set prices that allow them to recoup their costs but those
prices can turn out to be too high for buyers who just do not value the good
highly enough. In this context, the Friedman rule represents optimal policy
as long as there is free-entry of sellers. If there is an upper bound on the
number of sellers which binds su¢ ciently, moderate levels of in￿ ation can be
welfare improving.
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